As the costs of fuel and maintenance increase and regulations on weight and environmental impact tighten, there is an increasing push to transition on-board aircraft networks to wireless, reducing weight, fuel, maintenance time, and pollution. We outline a candidate short-range hybrid wired/wireless network for aircraft on-board communications using the common ZigBee protocol and privacy-preserving search implemented as a secure publish/subscribe system using specially coded meta-data. Formally specifying safety and security properties and modeling the network in NUX XMV enables verification and fault analysis via model checking and lays the groundwork for future certification avenues. We report on our experiments building and testing our candidate hybrid network and report on overhead and availability for encrypted and fault-tolerant communications, and propose a system that allows system designers to directly trade fault-tolerance for bandwidth, or vice-versa, in an encrypted privacy-preserving framework.
Migration of wired networks to hybrid wired-wireless networks requires a thorough study of the wired system, choosing an appropriate wireless communication protocol, assessing faults and security concerns associated with the wireless communication, and analysis of the quantitative benets of using a secured or unsecured wireless network. Each of these tasks are interdependent and require substantial understanding regarding expectations from the introduced wireless network with the primary requirement being that the new, hybrid wired-wireless network needs to be at least as safe, and secure, as the existing wired network. Our formal framework enables analysis of dierent hybrid wired-wireless network models, and allows us compare them to existing wired network models in terms of fault tolerance and fault propagation.
Contributions.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the rst work that addresses the problem of communication technology migration in terms of system safety and fault tolerance. The formal framework we present aids system designers in the comparison of dierent communication networks and the exploration of viable fault-tolerant mechanisms. The presented framework builds upon existing model checking and safety assessment tools, and is plug-and-play, making it fully COTS compatible. As a proof of concept, we formally model the ZigBee protocol and demonstrate analysis of a hybrid network using ZigBee for its wireless protocol. We propose additions to the ZigBee protocol that enhance the reliability and trustworthiness of wireless communication, while ensuring real-time deadlines are met. The new format adheres to existing ZigBee standards, and can be used with COTS equipment. These modications give the wireless system the ability to alter fault-tolerance and throughput capabilities in response to changing conditions on the aircraft. These, and similar, mechanisms provide the basic tools for establishing safe ZigBee network topologies with the current state-of-the-art. In the case of hardware failure redundant networks of ZigBee transmitters have shown fault-tolerance using fault detection and recovery mechanisms through disconnection and network rejoin with altered node roles. 3 While these approaches have lead to more reliable systems, they do not account for the challenges of network migration, or hybrid networks in which the techniques are not necessarily fully supported. Wireless avionics, and human interfaces for spacecraft 4 are pushing towards migration of wired networks to wireless. In the absence of fault-tolerance mechanisms, experimental performance evaluation has been employed to assess network reliability 5 to understand the likelihood of failure when it cannot be prevented. However, such experimentation is limited in terms of scenarios explored and environmental conditions, and does not scale. Our framework focuses on inter-component communication rather than protocol behavior. It allows the comparison of dierent networks in terms of safety, and is fully automatic and scalable.
Algorithms and techniques for searchable encryption 68 have been studied extensively in the context of cryptography, but have focused mostly on traditional cryptographic applications, and the primary focus has been eciency improvement and security formalization. The methods underlying searchable encryption 6 proved impractical and eroded security due to the necessity of generating every possible key that the search expression can match. To reduce the search cost, Bloom lters were used to create per-le searchable indexes 7 on the source data. However these studies required exact keyword search.
In theory, the use of exible search over regular expressions is allowed 9 but again the results prove impractical, requiring cipher-text and token sizes of the order O(2 nw ), where n is the number of input alphabet, and w is the the number of strings over the alphabet in the search query. Other recent studies have focused on cloud applications of data storage, such as the problem of similarity search 10 over the outsourced encrypted Cloud data and work that provides approximate search capability 11 for encrypted Cloud data. Approximate search capability is able to cover misspelling and typographical errors that exist in a search statement and in the source data, which signicantly extends exact keyword search through adaptation of the metric space. Methods for encrypted data 12 allow the construction of a tree-based index that enables the retrieval of the relevant entries. With this indexing method, similarity queries can be carried out with a small number of evaluations.
Other studies in the literature make use of encryption techniques that ensure that user privacy is not compromised by a data center. 
II. Background

II.A. Model Checking
Model checking has been successfully used in the aviation industry to verify that avionics systems uphold their safety requirements. 1729 We choose model checking as a verication method for our study due to the unique properties provided by this verication technique over using simulation or testing. These include the following:
• Model checking can analyze partial or incomplete designs; it can analyze both a logical system (such as code or a hardware logic design) and models of such a design as long as they are modeled in a formal semantics. This exibility is required for our wireless network analysis, as we need to analyze a model of the partial design. (If safety requirements are violated by a partial design, adding more detail or implementation will not save the system.)
• Model checking is an exhaustive analysis of the entire behavior space of the system, for all possible inputs; it is not probabilistic.
• The exhaustive nature of model checking means that we can prove the absence of bad behaviors in addition to the presence of good behaviors; these two sides of the proof are required to construct an appropriate safety case for eventual ight certication, e.g., as required by DO-178B, 30 and DO-254. 31
• Model checking nds the existence of any bad system execution, not how often that path is explored;
in other words, for this type of analysis all bad paths are of equal weight. This is important for our early-design-time analysis because we want to be able to eciently nd violations of our safety requirements, however rare, so that we can proceed with a more complete knowledge of what could go wrong than we can obtain, e,g., from rare-event simulation.
Tools based on model-checking technology 32, 33 have enjoyed a substantial and growing use over the last few years, and have recently been used to comparatively analyze multiple possible avionics system designs to narrow the design space early in the system design process. 20, 21 Given a system or system model M in some formal semantics, and a requirement ϕ in some mathematical logic, model checking is the task of exhaustively and automatically checking whether the model satises the requirement, designated M ϕ.
In the case that the system does not satisfy the requirement, the model checker returns a counterexample, which is a system execution trace exemplifying the requirement violation. The complete work ow is shown in Figure 1 .
We use the symbolic model checking tool nuXmv a because it is well-documented, 3537 freely available b , and frequently used in industry. 26 Figure 1 : Model checking an early-stage, partial design, as we do in this study, involves entering the system information (as a model) and requirements into a model checking tool. If there is disagreement between the model's operation and its requirements, a counterexample trace is returned. Otherwise, the system satises the specication. The process is iterative, including validating the inputs by analyzing the outputs (counterexample or agreement) to ensure they make sense in terms of the real system.
analyze requirements specied in LTL, yet we found it to be expressive enough to specify the pertinent requirements of our on-board network designs.
Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) formulas reason about linear timelines; LTL requirements are formulas
comprised of the following parts: 
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II.C.
Contract-based Design
A contract is a clear and concise description of the expected behavior of a system. Contract-based design is an emerging paradigm for the design of complex, multi-component systems. 37, 5259 We associate each component in the system with a contract. A contract is an LTL formula of the form Always(assumption → guarantee). Contracts implement assume-guarantee reasoning. In a contract, assumptions are the expectations the component has from the environment in which it operates, and guarantees are behavioral promises fullled by the component provided the assumptions are met. Contract-based design allows for compositional modeling by breaking down a large system into smaller components. It facilitates ecient re-use of a component between several systems when the contract holds in changed environments; this also simplies cross-validation of these models. Contract-based design allows easy re-use of components from a library provided the contracts of the swapped components are the same.
II.D. Fault Tree Analysis
Fault-tree Analysis is a top-down deductive failure analysis technique that uses Boolean logic to combine a series of undesired lower-level events and their combinations that lead to overall system failure. 68 Given a set of data to be stored or transmitted, this data is split into abstract sub-units of xed or dynamic size called blocks. We can treat each of these blocks as a vector of bytes and generate a syndrome by performing some calculation on each byte in the vector. In order to tolerate the loss of a single block in some set of n blocks we must rst compute a syndrome P that allows for the recovery of any lost block within the set. One of the simplest methods for doing so is XOR parity:
This new block P can then be stored and transmitted with the set, provided each block of the message is transmitted in such a way as to guarantee independence with respect to faults resulting in data loss. The loss of any one block, including the one containing P will not result in the loss of data. If some block B j fails to transmit, or is corrupted, operations can still be performed on the set as normal by recomputing the value of the lost block. Given a loss of a block not containing P , we rebuild some lost block B j as
for this example, but without loss of generality for other cases). If P is lost, the data can be used normally, and P can be recomputed as before.
In order to tolerate the loss of any two blocks, two independent syndromes must be calculated, here referred to as P and Q. We utilize the algebra of a Galois eld GF(2 8 ) 69 for the computation of Q to ensure the orthogonality of its construction. We utilize elements g called generators of the Galois eld such that g n doesn't repeat until it has exhausted all elements of the eld except {00}, where any numeral in {} is a hexadecimally represented Galois eld element. A full discussion of Galois eld algebra is fully explored in the literature. 70 For n blocks where n ≤ 255 we compute:
The loss of a single block can be recovered using the normal XOR parity method described previously.
The loss of P or Q can be recovered simply by recomputing using the above formulas. The loss of any single non-parity block, and the loss of Q can be recovered by rst recovering the non-parity block using XOR parity, and then recomputing Q. Recovering P , or the loss of two data drives is somewhat more involved, and the discussion of the method is left to the literature. 69
II.F. ZigBee Protocol
ZigBee is an IEEE 802.15.4 based specication protocol for small area networks. It is intended to be simpler and less expensive compared to Bluetooth or Wi. Its transmission distance is up to 10-100 meters, dependent on power output and environmental characteristics. The transmitted data is secured by 128bit symmetric encryption keys and has a maximum theoretical data rate of 250 kbits/sec. The ZigBee network layer natively supports star and tree networks, and generic mesh networking. Every ZigBee network must have one coordinator device, tasked with network creation, the control of its parameters and basic maintenance. The network is self-organized. It uses a node called the coordinator that acts as the primary ZigBee node and initiates network formation. The sensor nodes, or end-devices collect system values and send to the coordinator. The sensor nodes can connect directly to the coordinator or through an intermediate collector or router. Figure 4a shows communication between dierent nodes of a ZigBee network using a mesh topology. Coordinators and routers are always-on devices, whereas, end-devices look for an available coordinator when they power up. Figure 4b shows an abstracted version of the ZigBee protocol stack split between the ZigBee specication and the IEEE 802.15.4 specication.
III. Trustworthy Messaging for Aviation Systems
Two primary challenges present themselves when attempting to enable communication between systems over wireless networks in mission-and life-critical aviation systems, privacy and fault-tolerance. Unlike wired systems, wireless systems are prone to spoong and eavesdropping meaning it is critical that we are able to authenticate messages received, and hide the contents of messages from those without the appropriate privileges. In addition, we must ensure messages can survive natural faults occurring within the system, and attempts by adversaries to induce faults and corrupt messages to prevent transmission. To solve these challenges and build a trustworthy wireless messaging system for next-generation aviation systems we propose a novel, dynamic, messaging structure that combines fault-tolerance using parity, and Galois-eld based Figure 6 shows the small modication necessary to enable burst-formation and interpretation with ZigBee Packets.
Members of a burst allocate the rst 1 or 2 octets of their packet frame's payload (an overhead of less than 1.5%) to represent the payload index (i.e. the packet's index within a burst) and in the case of the rst packet in a payload, the size of payload. Normal data follows. Since this new format adheres to existing ZigBee standards, it can be used with COTS equipment and requires only a software interpreter at the end points of routed messages to interpret. If packets are lost at any point during transmission, they can be rebuilt with high probability either by the ultimate receiver, or by intermediate nodes in the mesh network.
Each data object being transmitted is further modied via encryption using current standards for endto-end encryption, such as ECCDHE.
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Included with the transmission are trap-door encrypted keywords that can be used by intermediaries to route and index information securely using the RESeED framework for regular-expression based search over encrypted data.
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This allows the data to be transmitted in a semioblivious manner. Individual nodes can route messages from any party along pathways without knowing their eventual destination, payload contents, or purpose. Authorized end-users and nodes can lter based on these trap-doors, or query nodes for available data without rst decrypting the stored data. This prevents adversaries from determining the content of messages, their origination, and their purpose.
Our proposed modications to the ZigBee wireless standard provides additional trustworthy capabilities necessary for the specic challenges of next-generation aerospace systems, such as those shown in Figure 7 .
Given the large physical footprint of most aerospace systems, the ZigBee protocol cannot be implemented in a universal broadcast fashion in which every device can communicate directly with every other device in the large mesh network. Messages will instead have to be relayed, sometimes over multiple hops. It is even possible that every intermediary that relays a message may not have the same permissions, or trust.
Individual nodes may be sourced from dierent contractors, may have been patched for vulnerabilities at dierent dates, and may be subject to dierent threats, such as backdoors or physical compromise. In compositional modeling. As the rst step, we abstract the ZigBee protocol to a form suitable for model checking. The models we use for fault analysis contain each component of the protocol stack of Figure 4b except the Security Services sub components. Figure 8 shows the abstracted communication network model for a ZigBee end-device and coordinator. The framework uses three tools: OCRA 53 for component based modeling, contract-based design and renement, nuXmv 37 for model checking, and xSAP 78 for safety assessment and analysis. Figure 9 shows the nominal framework model of the ZigBee wireless communication system. The framework can be adapted to any wireless network protocol by modifying the behavior of the layered wireless network components in the framework. For wired systems, the framework can be modied by removing the wireless components altogether. 
IV.A. Nominal Models
For the nominal case, i.e. no faults in the system, the behavior of each component in the framework is simply to output whatever appears at the input. This is veried by using a simple assume → guarantee requirement where assume = input and guarantee = output. OCRA is used to generate the composite SMV le that connects all the components of the model into one SMV le.
IV.B. Extended Models
For the extended case, the SMV behavior of selected components is modied to include faults and OCRA is run again to generate the composite SMV le. In the current phase of the work, some of the faults are trivial. Others were derived from a subset of faults associated with a ZigBee network covered in existing literature. The framework can be used with any wireless network whose faults are known a priori.
Faults in a wired system In the extended model for the wired system, the only fault we modeled was of a wire breaking (W1) as shown in Table 1 . The other faults C1 and S2 are general faults associated with the sensor system. C1 models the failure of the error recovery mechanism, whereas S2 is a harder fault and models the failure of the sensor itself. Table 2 shows the faults modeled in our extended wireless system.
V. Experimental Results
In order to assess fault tolerance, we model the occurrence of failures predicted by our fault tree constructions with the assumption that packet failures satisfy the Markovian assumptions, i.e. the process of packet failures is stateless and independent. 79 Under this assumption we evaluate our failures as a Poisson process 80 and solve numerically. Our primary interest is in evaluating the probability that a burst suers 3 or more failures, as such situations are unrecoverable under our current error correction and fault-tolerance. This is primarily a function of the burst payload size, and our expectations are that as the number of payload packets increase per burst, fault-tolerance will drop, but bandwidth utilization will improve.
The probability that a burst will fail is given by 81 k is the maximum number of faults we can tolerate without burst failure, and λ is the expected number of failures per burst. For our purposes we work with k = 2 due to the limitations of our syndrome mechanisms. We nd λ as a function of the data-transmission rate r. This rate, r is either 20kbps or 250kbps, depending on the band being used. We make the assumption that r is 20kbps for the results presented in this paper, but also computed the results for 250kbps with similar results. The per packet failure rate is given in this equation as µ. The congurable number of packets per burst is represented as b. Lastly the size of the packet is given as s and assumed to be 512 bits for our evaluation. With these substitutions our nal expression for λ as
V.A. Formal Fault Analysis
In order to generate estimates for the per packet failure rate µ, both for our experiment, and as a tool for systems to deploy for runtime estimation during operation, we designed models for the nominal and o-nominal behavior of our ZigBee system. The nominal system was organized using OCRA, which then generates a composite SMV le. Faults were injected manually in the composite nominal SMV le using For fault tree analysis, our top-level event was the negation of our top-level requirement. Figure 10 and Figure 11 show a sample fault tree and the cut set and minimal cut sets generated by xSAP for the extended wired model.
For the ZigBee wireless network, Figure 12 shows fault trees for the extended model, and Figure 13 and Figure 14 show the cut set and minimal cut sets generated by xSAP. After the points of failure are determined, a failure function assigns probabilities to individual faults. The overall failure probability needs to be equal to or less than the failure probability of the wired system. Similarly, multiple wireless systems can also be compared. 
V.B. Results
The empirical results of our analysis are given in Figures 15a to 15d Figures 15a and 15b) to as high as 10% in extreme circumstances (Figure 15d ). We present results where the failure rate per burst is no higher than roughly 0.03, representing an expected loss of at most 3% of bursts during transmission to show the impact on our tunable parameter (data packets per burst) on bandwidth utilization for data, and our ability to tolerate packet failures. As can be seen from the plots, our system is not only robust in the presence of failures, but the tunability allows systems to optimize performance with respect to the most important metric for a given situation, regardless of the current failure rate experienced by packets.
VI. Conclusions and Future Work
We demonstrate a proof of concept for the development of a framework for a comparative fault analysis of wired and wireless communication networks. The work is still incomplete in terms of quantitative evaluation.
The formal framework model is plug-and-play in the sense that new wireless protocol behavior models can be plugged in easily in to the composite system model with minor modications. and communication medium (wires, dierent frequencies) will help designers in identifying optimum fault tolerance techniques. Extending the framework to include more wireless communication protocols will help better identify wired components of the aircraft than can be migrated to wireless. A desirable extension will be automatic introduction of fault tolerant architectures to achieve a desired probability.
We intend to implement our proposed extension to the ZigBee framework for dynamic fault-tolerance and bandwidth utilization to show its ecacy in practice, COTS deployability, and to demonstrate how simple automated reasoning on-board an aircraft could be used to estimate the current packet failure rate and adaptively modify the burst conguration to meet mission-critical goals for transmission.
